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Security Information

Official Diary

Wednesday, 1 October 1952

25X1A9a

25X1A9a

1. Mr. Polyzoides phoned respecting a [REDACTED] applicant for a position with CIA, and [REDACTED] later saw [REDACTED], who referred 25X1A9a him to the Personnel Office.

25X1A5a1

25X1A5a1

2. Brigadier Tiltman phoned and conveyed to me the substance of a message received from [REDACTED] in response to my recent request to [REDACTED] 25X1A5a1 for assistance. I later requested that Tiltman send me, in writing, a summary of [REDACTED] message.

3. At the Deputies' meeting, recommended to the Director that he attempt to persuade Congressman Walters to defer his appearance before the Un-American Activities Committee. [REDACTED] at my suggestion, undertook to 25X1A9a conduct the necessary investigation of Walters and follow through on this.

25X9A5

25X1X7

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25X1X7

[REDACTED]

25X1A9a

7. Conferred with [REDACTED] concerning my revised directive on the Brownell Committee Report, which he approved in principle.

25X1A9a

8. Also spoke with [REDACTED] who will be coming in to see the DCI and who is a prospective assistant for me.

9. At the Deputies' meeting, informed the DCI that there would be some delay in the presentation of the summary evaluation paper.

25X1X7

[REDACTED]

11. Posed to General Cabell the question of a "Commander's Estimate" for the President and we agreed that the primary deficit at the present time was an adequate staff required to prepare the necessary basic studies. I indicated my intention to discuss this at some later date with him.

12. General Cabell raised a question as to the recent procedure followed by O/NE in circulating the Joint Staff's comments on certain aspects of NIE-64 to the agencies. He stated that this had been somewhat embarrassing to him, since these expressions of views were those of the individual planners and had not been coordinated with the various Military agencies. General Cabell was fully in agreement with the procedure that I had previously suggested to Sherman Kent, namely, that O/NE adopt these comments as its own position, if it felt so advised, without attribution to the Joint Staff. Later confirmed this arrangement with Sherman Kent.

13. Discussed with Mr. Sheldon the following:

- 25X1A9a
- a. Mr. Sheldon indicated that they were unwilling to take [REDACTED] 25X1A9a [REDACTED] and I shall have to speak to Mr. Wisner about this.
- b. Reviewed briefly current developments respecting the black book for the President-elect.

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- c. Indicated to Mr. Sheldon my disappointment that the recent O/NE paper in the Middle East had not been considered jointly at a Board meeting by O/NE and O/CI. Expressed to him my strong desire that this be done on any similar paper in the future.
- d. Suggested that Mr. Sheldon draft a cable of inquiry to Admiral Overesch as to whether or not the present schedule respecting Strategic Division was adequate. Sheldon would be willing to send [REDACTED] of O/CI, if that were desired.
- 25X1A9a
14. Attended special PRC meeting.
15. Arranged to speak with Phil Graham of the Washington Post on Thursday evening.
- 25X1A9a
16. Had a general discussion with [REDACTED] covering the following:
- a. I expressed appreciation for the various reports and papers he had been sending.
- 25X1X7
- b. [REDACTED]
- c. [REDACTED]
17. Discussed at some length by phone with General Magruder the question of delegation as it arose on the Brownell directive.
18. Attended the IADs' meeting.
- 25X1A9a
19. [REDACTED] phoned and stated that he had been instructed by General Willems to stimulate more adequate economic and political indicators

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25X1A9a for the Watch Committee. I suggested that he talk with Messrs. Sheldon and Amory and later informed Mr. Sheldon that [REDACTED] would be in touch with him on this.

20. General Weckerling phoned, indicating the desirability of a crash estimate on Iran. I discussed this with Sherman Kent, who felt that O/NE could add nothing to the conclusion contained in NIE-64 at this time. I shall check this conclusion and talk with Weckerling about it.

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